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Economic inequality can have grave impacts on health and wellbeing, yet the 
mechanisms behind it are still not fully understood. Previous studies on entitlement 
suggest that people from lower socioeconomic status (SES) brackets express a 
depressed sense of entitlement in relation to people with higher SES. However, the 
effect of entitlement in unfair and socially provocative situations is unclear. This study 
used the ultimatum game (UG) to generate a socially provocative situation in which 
participants in an all-male study played as responders and had the decision to accept or 
reject an unfair offer. To measure entitlement, participants reported how much they 
expected the proposer to offer them in the UG. As expected, SES predicted 
expectations, such that the higher one’s SES, the greater their expectations in the UG. 
Furthermore, expectations mediated the relationships between subjective SES and offer 
decisions, perceptions of the offer as unfair, and feelings towards the offer (bothered, 
dejected, angry). These findings suggest that entitlement plays a role in the relationship 
between SES and behaviors in unfair and socially provocative situations such as the 
UG. 
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Introduction 
From gender to family standing and personal income, certain aspects related to 
status influence what people expect and feel they deserve. With presidential candidates 
making lewd comments and their followers inciting violence, the inflammatory 2016 
United States (U.S.) presidential election brought up the question of entitlement—what 
the politicians and their supporters felt and expected to earn. In the heat of the 
presidential elections, a long-time political journalist stated that both presidential 
candidates exhibited a sense of entitlement based on their wealth and prestige, measures 
of socioeconomic status (SES; Leubsdorf, 2016). Both presidential candidates came 
from high SES backgrounds and Leubsdorf (2016) argued that their relative status led 
them to feel entitled to certain behaviors. Another journalist claimed that the electoral 
process of electing a president was unfair, oftentimes contradicting the popular vote and 
provoking unrest (Prokop, 2016). Furthermore, with presidential candidate Donald 
Trump making socially provocative comments, many traditionally marginalized 
communities felt cheated and unsafe after the results of the election (O’Keefe, 2016). 
By creating an unsafe and socially provocative environment, the 2016 presidential 
elections provided an example of how entitlement in high SES individuals can play out 
in unfair conditions, a situation few studies have addressed. The purpose of this study 
was to identify if and how SES was associated with entitlement in an unfair situation. In 
other words, this study asked how entitlement, measured through expectations of 
earnings, affected the relationship between SES and decisions, perceptions, and feelings 
in a socially provocative, economic-decision making game. 
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System Justification Theory 
Entitlement describes the idea that some people deserve more than others, 
leading them to expect certain outcomes. When people with high SES expect more 
because they feel entitled, they legitimize the current status quo of income inequality in 
America. For instance, estimates suggest the top 1% of Americans hold nearly 50% of 
the wealth, topping levels seen just before the Great Depression (Davies, Sandstorm, 
Shorrocks, & Wolff, 2009). Income is one particularly poignant way to measure SES 
since income inequality has devastating impacts on health and wellbeing (Wilkinson & 
Pickett, 2009). System justification theory can explain income inequality. As a process 
that legitimizes current social arrangements even at the expense of group and personal 
interests, system justification theory asserts that people support and sustain the status 
quo even in unfair situations (Jost & Banaji, 1994). Unlike group justification theories 
that posit ethnocentricity and group solidarity lead to dissonance and action, system 
justification theory notes rebellion is the exception, rather than the norm (Jost, Banaji, 
& Nosek, 2004). Without rebellion and protest, bystanders may judge people, especially 
from lower status groups, as passive or apathetic, however this is not the case. Rather, 
proponents of system justification theory suggest that members of disadvantaged groups 
want to see the world as just, dependable, and legitimate (Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & 
Sullivan, 2003). Seeing the world in any other way—as unjust and intolerable—would 
cause people from disadvantaged backgrounds to have thoughts that deviate from the 
existing social system. Cognitive dissonance theory assumes that such inconsistencies 
in thoughts and behaviors motivate people to find resolve, contributing to system 
justification theory’s emphasis that cognitive and motivational factors interact to help 
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people hamper guilt by rationalizing the status quo (Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 
2003; Chen & Tyler, 2001). By justifying the status quo, people from disadvantaged 
and advantaged groups can live in economically unfair societies. 
Entitlement and Expectations 
 In regards to maintaining the status quo of economic inequality, members of 
disadvantaged groups may exhibit different behaviors than members of advantaged 
groups. Jost, Banaji, and Nosek’s (2004) overview of system justification theory 
hypothesized people from disadvantaged groups express a depressed sense of 
entitlement. In other words, people from low status groups support and justify the social 
order to a greater degree than members of advantaged groups (Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & 
Sullivan, 2003). For instance, research by Pelham and Hetts (2001) found that 
regardless of gender, people in low paying jobs showed evidence of depressed-
entitlement when working on a difficult task. Their research suggests SES, controlling 
for status discrepancies inherent in gender, predicts feelings of entitlement. People with 
low SES are considered disadvantaged because they have access to fewer resources than 
people with high SES. According to Major (1994), social comparison biases prevent 
awareness of disadvantage, while attribution biases legitimize disadvantage in groups 
such as those with low SES. Social comparison biases encompass the tendency to 
compare with others like the self and with one’s past outcomes, causing members of 
high and low status groups to have different standards of comparison when evaluating 
outcomes (O’Brien & Major, 2009).  Hence, people with low SES expect less because 
they see the status quo of inequality as what is as well as what ought to be (Major, 
1994). An important factor in system justification theory, depressed-entitlement 
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suggests that in economic-decision making, people with low SES will feel entitled to 
less favorable outcomes. 
If members of disadvantaged groups express depressed-entitlement, then 
members of advantaged groups should experience the opposite, an elevated sense of 
entitlement. Elevated-entitlement refers to the belief held by a member of a privileged 
group, that they deserve—they have a right—to their position of relative advantage 
(Major, 1994). High SES can lead to greater material resources, which in turn leads to 
more social and political privileges. In regards to unequal payoffs, people treated their 
entitlements as rights when experimental institutions led them to believe they had 
earned those rights (Hoffman & Spitzer, 1985). For instance, in the U.S. men enjoy 
relatively more status than women and seem to feel that personal feelings of self-esteem 
entitle them to a certain level of payment, regardless of the quality of their performance 
(Pelham & Hetts, 2001). These findings suggest that men have an elevated sense of 
entitlement compared to women. However, gender is only one factor in determining 
status and relative advantage. For instance, the Psychological Entitlement Scale 
attempts to measure a stable and pervasive sense that one deserves more than others 
(Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman, 2010). Research suggests that SES 
plays a role in entitlement, such that people with higher subjective SES score higher on 
the Psychological Entitlement Scale (Piff, 2014). Associated with both gender and 
subjective SES, elevated-entitlement is the idea that one deserves more than others 
based on who they are, not what they have done.  
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Entitlement in Men 
SES and gender play a role in determining relative status, as well as elevated- 
and depressed-entitlement. Although men express elevated-entitlement in relation to 
women, little research has investigated whether intragroup differences exist between 
men. Status differences in men may relate to feelings of depressed-entitlement and 
greater acceptance of disadvantageous income inequalities (Albrecht, von Essen, 
Fliessbach, & Falk, 2013). The phenomenon of depressed-entitlement in men with 
lower status, relates to system justifying beliefs (SJBs), belief systems that justify 
hierarchical and unequal relationships between groups in society (O’Brien & Major, 
2009). SJBs explain system justification theory’s assertion that low status people 
maintain the status quo and why people with high SES might exhibit elevated-
entitlement. For instance, different cultures have different belief systems to justify 
social inequality, so SJBs gain the power to legitimize social inequality through their 
presumed collective endorsement within a culture (Major, 1994). SJBs infer that high 
status groups have more inputs than low status groups, leading members of high status 
groups to believe they deserve better outcomes (O’Brien & Major, 2009). SES measures 
social class, or where one stands in society. In terms of inputs, in comparison with low 
SES groups, members of high SES groups have greater access to resources, including 
material and social goods. Social goods include influences like political power and 
authority—the ability to influence change in society, change that could level out the 
economic playing field. While members of higher SES groups have greater access to 
resources, that access does not extend beyond their group. In other words, the 
possession of greater goods equates to less generosity and unethical decision-making 
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tendencies such as unrightfully taking or benefiting from something (Piff, Kraus, Côte, 
Cheng, & Keltner, 2010; Piff, Stancato, Côte, Mendoza-Denton, & Keltner, 2012). 
From greed to narcissism, elevated-entitlement derived from a higher social class leads 
to a variety of behaviors that maintain the status quo (Piff, 2014). Although the specific 
factors underlying these behaviors remains relatively unexplored, initial evidence 
suggests that men with higher SES might express elevated-entitlement compared to men 
from who have lower SES. 
Ultimatum Game and Entitlement 
This study used the economic paradigm of the ultimatum game (UG) to measure 
entitlement through expectations (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982; Hu et al., 
2016). The UG is an economic decision-making game involving two players: a proposer 
and a responder. The proposer decides how to split a sum of money (e.g., $10) between 
themselves and the responder (e.g., $9, $1 split). The responder can accept the proposed 
offer or the responder can reject the offer. If the responder accepts the offer, the money 
is split as proposed (e.g., $9, $1 split). However, if the responder rejects the offer, both 
players receive $0. A round of the UG concludes after the responder makes a decision 
to accept or reject the proposer’s offer. According to game theory (Selten, 1965), 
responders should accept any offer greater than $0 as this would result in a financial 
gain.  However, responders generally accept fair offers (e.g., $5, $5 split) and reject 
unfair offers (e.g. $8, $2 split), despite the fact that rejecting an offer results in no 
financial gain (Henrich et al., 2006; Nowak, Page, & Sigmund, 2000; Ochs & Roth, 
1989). One variable that might impact UG behavior is expectations. Expectations, or 
how much the responder thinks the proposer will offer, measure a form of entitlement. 
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For instance, by evaluating the expected offer amount, expectations measure how much 
the responder expects to earn or how much they believe they deserve, a key component 
of entitlement (O’Brien & Major, 2009).  
H1: This study hypothesized that SES would predict expectations in the UG, 
such that higher SES would lead to greater expectations.  
Ultimatum Game and Unfairness 
The UG is also a paradigm to measure responses to social provocation when 
responders are offered an unfair amount. Of interest to the present study is that 
entitlement may also influence the way men engage in socially provocative situations. 
System justification theory proposes that people have a general motive to maintain 
fairness and legitimacy (van der Toorn & Jost, 2014). In unfair situations, it is 
disadvantageous for someone with low SES to expect more or feel entitled since it 
would disturb the status quo. Hence, people tend to judge the fairness of a situation in 
their own self-interest (Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997). Although people may have a 
vested interest in viewing an event as fair, some situations may be so unfair that they 
are socially provocative. In that case, unfair situations can threaten status and warrant 
retaliation (Pillutla & Murnighan,1996; Güth, 1995). However, few studies have 
investigated how entitlement effects the way individuals across the SES field respond to 
situations that are clearly unfair or socially provocative.  
Status Anxiety and the Ultimatum Game 
 With expectations as the mechanism, concerns with status might effect 
decisions in the UG. For instance, accepting an unfair offer results in a perceived loss of 
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status for the responder who earns less money than the proposer. In contrast, both 
players earn the same amount when the responder rejects an offer, hence rejecting an 
offer may maintain status or prevent a loss in status. In line with this reasoning, some 
researh indicates that high concerns for status motivate rejections of unfair offers in the 
UG (Brañas-Garza, Espín, Exadaktylos, & Hermann, 2014; Espín, Exadaktylos, 
Herrmann, & Brañas-Garza, 2015; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996; Raihani & Bshary, 
2015; Yamagishi et al., 2009, 2012). People with high concerns for status may exhibit 
status anxiety, the worry that one is unable to conform to the ideals of success as 
defined by society and as a result, may be stripped of dignity and respect (de Botton, 
2008). As an index of resources, having high SES can satisfy material and esteem 
needs, leading Bukowski (2011) to argue that lower SES individuals express less status 
anxiety, instead worrying about fufilling other needs. Hence, rejecting an offer in the 
UG may be seen as a response to status anxiety. 
Ultimatum Game and Decisions 
Recent research has manipulated status to determine the effects it has on offer 
decisions, specifically looking at rejections of unfair offers. Hu et al. (2016) 
manipulated status through a rank-inducing task (Zink et al., 2008) before participants 
played each of six rounds of the UG. The study found that participants rejected unfair 
offers more frequently when they were in high status than when they were in low status. 
In addition to measuring the participants’ decisions, Hu et al. (2016) found that when 
compared with low status, participants in high status indicated they would have 
allocated more to themselves if given the opportunity to act as proposer in the UG. 
These findings are in line with past research showing an entitlement effect during asset 
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distribution (Albrecht, von Essen, Fliessbach, & Falk, 2013; Ball & Eckel, 1996; Ball, 
Eckel, Grossman, & Zame, 2001; Hu, Cao, Blue, & Zhouh, 2014). This effect may 
result from differences in orientation towards others while occupying different levels of 
social status (Hu et al., 2016). The rejection of unfair offers by high status subjects 
points to a trend of high status individuals feeling more entitled. Indeed, research 
suggests high status individuals may feel entitled to more in bargaining situations and 
have stronger motivations to perserve their social standing compared to low status 
individuals (Ball, Eckel, Grossman, & Zame, 2001; Hu, Cao, Blue & Zhouh, 2014; Hu 
et al., 2016). Still, there are inconsentanices in the literature in regards to the role status 
plays in rejecting unfair offers in the UG. For instance, when Bratanova, Loughnan, 
Klein, and Wood (2016) manipulated status, they found that participants primed to feel 
poor rejected offers more frequently than people primed to feel wealthy. Although there 
is some evidence that manipulating status leads to greater offer rejections amonst high 
status individuals, findings across studies are mixed. This study sought to expand on 
previous findings by looking at the role of expectations in the relationship between SES 
and UG decisions. To expand on existing research, this study measured entitlement 
through participants’ expected offer amount in the UG (Hu, Cao, Blue, & Zhouh, 2014; 
Hu et al., 2016). 
H2:This study hypothesized that expectations would mediate the relationship 
between SES and offer decisions, such that the effect of SES on offer decisions 
would be lessened by expectations. 
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Perceptions and Feelings in the Ultimatum Game 
Perceptions of the offer and feelings towards the offer can further measure status 
concerns. For example, in neural activation studies, activation of the bilateral anterior 
insula, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), and the anterior cinguilate cortex were 
associated with receiving unfair offers in the UG (Hu et al., 2016; Sanfey, Rilling, 
Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003). Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen 
(2003) found that participants who rejected a higher proportion of unfair offers 
displayed stonger activation of the bilateral anterior insula, which is associated with 
negative emotional states, mainly anger and disgust. The researchers suggested that the 
anterior insula and DLPFC, which is linked to cognitive maintainance and executive 
control, represent twin demands of the UG, the emotional goal of resisting unfair offers 
and the cogntive goal of accumilating money, respectively. In a another study, van ‘t 
Wout, Kahn, Sanfey, and Aleman (2006) found an association between emotional 
responses as measured by skin conductance and rejections of unfair offers made by 
humans. One emotional response that might be linked to unfair offers in the UG is 
anger. Pillutla and Murningham (1996) suggested that fully informed respondents who 
perceived UG offers as unfair also felt angry and that anger can led them to act 
spitefully by rejecting an economically valuable offer. Research by Pfister and Böhm 
(2012) took these findings a step further by testing whether responders would punish 
the proposer out of anger or a third party out of envy in a three-party, modified UG. 
They found that responders almost exclusively punished the proposer for unfair offers, 
and there was no indication of envy-related rejections towards a third party. In addition, 
when only 1 Euro was allocated to the responder, anger persisted on a high level, 
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irrespective of how much the third party was offered.  However, Pfister and Böhm 
(2012) only measured anger in relation to the proposer, not the offer itself. Research has 
found that anger is positively correlated with entitlement, such that the more entitled a 
person feels, the more likely provocation leads to anger (Witte, Callahan, & Perez-
Lopez, 2002). If high SES individuals experience elevated-entitlement, they should also 
be quicker to anger in socially provocative situtations. To test this, this study measured 
whether responders viewed low offers (e.g. $8, $2 split) as unfair, aggressive, 
disrespectful, and/or greedy. In addition, it measured feelings towards offers as either 
bothered, dejected, or angry.  
H3: This study hypothesized that expectations would mediate the relationship 
between SES and perceptions of unfair offers (unfair, disrespectful, greedy, 
aggressive). 
H4: This study hypothesized that expectations would mediate the relationship 
between the SES measures and feelings towards the offer (dejected, bothered, 
angry).  
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Methods 
Participants and Procedure 
 We recruited 609 male participants using Amazon Mechanical Turk (M-
turk). The mean age of our participants was 30.25 (SD=9.24) and the age of participants 
ranged from 18—65. In terms of ethnicity, 64.5% of participants identified as European 
Americans, 9% as Hispanic/Latinos,  8.2% as African Americans, 7.1% as Asian or 
Pacific Islander, 1.1% as Native Americans, and 10% as “other.” Participants varied in 
sexual orientation with 86% identifying as heterosexual, 7.9% as homosexual, 4.8% as 
bisexual, and 1.3% identifying as “other.” Participants also reported their native 
language with 95.9% of participants reporting English as their native language, 1.6% as 
Spanish, 0.3% as French, 0.2% as Chinese, and 2% reported their native language as 
“other”. After completing the demographic questionnaire (including questions on SES 
as described below), participants followed each of the measurements described below in 
the order presented. After completing the study, participants were debriefed, informed 
of the real purpose of the study, and provided contact information should they have any 
questions. Participants were compensated 3 US dollars for the completion of this study.  
Measures 
Subjective SES scale. Subjective SES was measured using the MacArthur Scale 
of Subjective Social Status (SES Ladder) (Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000). 
The measure uses a symbolic ladder with ten rungs to create a pictorial representation of 
social status. The top rungs of the ladder represent the people who are the best off—
those who have the most money, best education, and the most respected jobs. While the 
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bottom rungs of the ladder represent the people who are the worst off—those who have 
the least amount of money, least education, and least respected jobs or no job. 
Participants in this study viewed the SES Ladder and placed themselves in a category 
from one to ten, with ten representing the highest rung of the ladder. 
Objective SES. Objective SES was measured through maternal education 
(Dubow, Boxer, & Huesmann, 2009; Mercy & Steelman, 1982) and parental income 
(Mayer, 1997) in order to include younger participants who might not yet have their 
own income. Maternal education was measured by the highest degree earned and was 
coded into five categories: (1) some high school,  (2) high school graduate, (3) some 
college,  (4) four-year college degree, or (5) advanced degree (Master’s or PhD.) 
Parental income was measured in 12 contiguous categories ranging from less than (1) 
$20,000 to greater than (12) $200,000.  
Ultimatum Game. To measure perceptions and feelings related to economic 
decision-making, all participants played a computerized version of the UG (Güth, 
Schmittberger, Schwarze, 1982; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003). In 
the UG, participants believed they were randomly assigned the role of the responder and 
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would play the UG with either an anonymous teammate or a rival.1 However, in reality, 
the participants played the UG against an automated computer response. The other 
individual (the fictitious proposer) made an offer to share an amount (predetermined) of 
two out of ten tickets with the participant. Each ticket represented a chance to win a $50 
gift card in a random drawing at the end of the study. Participants believed the more 
tickets they had, the greater their chances of winning the gift card. 
 After the offer was made, participants could either accept or reject the offer. If 
the participant accepted the offer, the ten tickets would be split in the manner 
proposed—the participant would receive two tickets and the (fictitious) proposer would 
keep eight tickets. If they rejected the offer, both the responder and the proposer would 
receive zero tickets. After making their decision, participants answered a series of 
questions about their perceptions and feelings towards the offer and their decision to 
accept or reject the offer (see below).  Participants only played one round of the UG 
before completing the study in order to simplify the socially provocative situation and 
                                                        
1The teammate or rival was a fictitious computer response designed to help implement several different 
experimental conditions for a larger study. These conditions made up two manipulations: a social-context 
manipulation and a group membership manipulation. Before beginning the study, participants were told 
they would be assigned to a team based on geographic location and a few demographic similarities. The 
teams were fictitious, computer responses. After being assigned to a team, team members got to know 
each other through responses on vignettes containing some social confrontations and aggressive 
behaviors (the social-context manipulation). Participants were always “randomly” selected to go last, so 
that they could read their teammates responses to the vignettes. In the pro-aggression condition, 
teammates condoned aggressive behavior to gain status. In the neutral-aggression condition, teammates 
neither agreed nor disagreed with the behavior. In the anti-aggression condition, teammates strongly 
opposed aggressive behavior to gain status. After responding to the vignettes, the participants competed 
in the UG against either a teammate or a rival (the group membership manipulation). Participants 
believed all of their teammates would see their responses to the vignettes as well as their decision in the 
UG and use this information to elect a team leader. The team leader would decide how to split the 
winnings should their team win the later, team versus team competition. However, this competition did 
not actually take place. The teams, responses to vignettes, and UG offers were all automated computer 
responses. Since these manipulations were outside of the context of this study, the results will be reported 
elsewhere. 
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eliminate confounding variables. At the start of the UG, participants answered a series 
of attention checks to make sure they understood the rules and instructions. These 
attention checks asked the participants how many tickets the proposer or responder 
would get if the responder accepted or rejected a theoretical offer. After completing 
three attention checks, the participants began the game.   
Expectations. Upon making a decision to accept or reject the offer, participants 
reported how many tickets they were expecting to be offered from the proposer. 
Participants selected a number from 1 to 10 to represent the amount of tickets they 
expected.  
Perceptions. After reporting the amount of tickets they expected, participants 
were asked to evaluate the proposer’s offer. Participants were also asked to evaluate 
their responses to the proposer’s offer. Participants rated their evaluations of the offer 
and their evaluations of their response to the offer on 7-point Likert scales. The scales 
included measures of aggression, unfairness, disrespect, and greed. Aggression was 
measured on a scale of (1) friendly to (7) aggressive, unfairness on a scale of (1) fair to 
(7) unfair, disrespect on a scale of (1) respectful to (7) disrespectful, and greed on a 
scale from (1) generous to (7) greedy.  
After rating the proposer’s offer, participants ranked in order of importance the 
features of the proposer’s offer that influenced their decision as well as the features that 
influenced their response to the offer. Participants ranked their perceptions of offers and 
their responses to offers as fair/unfair, respectful/disrespectful, generous/greedy, and 
friendly/aggressive. 
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We used the data we collected to create composite, or weighted, scores for 
perceptions of the offer and responses to the offer. These scores were calculated by 
multiplying the raw score by the rank (reverse coded). For instance, to achieve a 
weighted score for perceptions of unfairness, a participant’s reported score for their 
perceptions of the offer as unfair was multiplied by the place they placed fair/unfair on 
the ranking scale, which was reverse coded.  
Emotional Ratings. We measured participants’ feelings towards the offer with 
three, 7-point Likert scales. Participants reported how the felt on three items on 7 point 
scales: a) calm to bothered, b) upbeat to dejected, and c) happy to angry.  
Statistical Analysis Strategy. To test our hypotheses, we conducted a statistical 
analysis using SPSS software (v23). First, we conducted regression analyses that tested 
the relationship between SES and expectations of offers. Second, we conducted 
meditation analyses using the PROCESS macro in SPSS (Model 4; v2.16, Hayes, 
2013). In these analyses we examined if expected amount of offered tickets mediated 
the relationship between SES and a) degree to which individuals accepted or rejected 
offers (0 coded as accept and 1 coded as reject); b) perceptions of the offers; c) 
emotions experienced towards the offers. The mediation analyses in the present study 
moved beyond Baron and Kenny’s (1986) causal step approach to test for statistical 
mediation.2 The current study used a bootstrapping approach to provide a mean estimate                                                         
2 The causal steps approach popularized by Baron and Kenny (1986) stipulates that there are four steps 
that need to be met in order to establish that mediation occurred. To establish that there is an effect that 
may be mediated, the first step requires showing that the independent variable is correlated with the 
dependent variable. The second step requires showing that the independent variable is associated with the 
mediator, while the third step must show the mediator affects the dependent variable. To establish full 
mediation— the mediator completely mediates the independent-dependent variable relationship—the 
fourth and final step should show that the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable 
controlling for the mediator is zero. Despite the popularity of this method, there are some fundamental 
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of the indirect effect and 95% confidence interval (Hayes, 2009). The indirect effect is 
the product of the a path and b path, and measures the effect of the independent 
variable on the dependent variable through the mediator. For the bootstrapping 
estimation approach, a 95% confidence interval that does not contain zero indicates a 
significant mediation.  
Preliminary Analyses 
The majority of participants fell in the middle of the 10-point SES ladder 
(M=5.34), with 5.7% in the bottom quintile and 2.4% in the top quintile (see Figure 1). 
For parental income, 9.7% of participants had a combined parental income of less than 
$20,000, while 7.1% of participants had parental incomes greater than $200,000 (see 
Table 1).  In terms of maternal education, 4.4% had some high school, 15.8% were high 
school graduates, 35.3% had some college, 28.7% had a four-year degree, and 15.8% of 
participants reported their mothers had an advanced degree (Masters or PhD).  
                                                        
flaws. For instance, Hayes (2009) states that the causal steps approach is the lowest in power. That is, if 
the independent variable’s effect on the dependent variable is indirectly carried out by the mediator, the 
causal steps approach is the least likely to detect this mediation. Also, according to Hayes (2009), it is 
possible for the mediator to affect the relationship between the independent and dependent variable even 
if the independent and dependent aren’t associated. Thus, even though the c path is not significant in all 
of our models, there is still possibility for a significant mediation.  
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Figure 1. MacArthur Scale of Subjective Status.  
This figure illustrates the number of participants in each quintile of the SES ladder. 
 
Table 1. Comparison of Parental Income across Participants. 
Parental income Number of participants Percent of participants 
 
1. Less than $20,000 
2. $20,000 to $29,000 
3. $30,000 to $39,000 
4. $40,000 to $49,000 
5. $50,000 to $59,000 
6. $60,000 to $69,000 
7. $70,000 to $79,000 
8. $80,000 to $89,000 
9. $90,000 to $99,000 
10. $100,000 to 
$149,000 
11. $150,000 to 
$200,000 
12. Greater than 
$200,000 
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Results 
Correlational Analyses. The independent variables—the SES Ladder, maternal 
education, and parental income—were analyzed to examine whether they correlated 
with the dependent variables and mediator. A bivariate correlational analysis revealed 
that the independent variables, the SES measures, were all positively correlated with 
each other (see Table 2). In addition, The SES Ladder showed a significant, positive 
correlation with the expected amount of offered tickets and the offer decision (see Table 
2). The expected offer amount was also significantly and positively correlated with 
evaluations of the offer as unfair, disrespectful, greedy, and aggressive (see Table 3). 
After seeing and responding to the offer, participants reported their feelings towards the 
offer. All of the feelings were positively correlated with each other (see Table 4).  
 
 
 
Table 2. Results of Correlational Analysis for Model 1 
 1 2 3 4 5 
(1) SES Ladder -     
(2) Maternal Education .15* -    
(3) Parental Income .27* .34* -   
(4) Expected Offer .14* -.07 .05 -  
(5) Offer Decision -.06 -.02 -.05 .15* - 
*p<.01, **p<.05 
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Table 3. Results of Correlational Analysis for Model 2 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
(1) SES 
Ladder -            
(2) 
Maternal 
Ed. 
.15* -           
(3) 
Parental 
Income 
.27* .33* -          
(4) 
Expected 
Offer 
.14* -.07 .05 -         
(5) Unfair 
(raw) -.13* -.04 .08 .17* -        
(6) Unfair 
(weighted
) 
-.06* .02 .07 .09** .57* -       
(7) 
Disrespect 
(raw) 
-.07 -.01 .07 .11* .64* .28* -      
(8) 
Disrespect 
(weighted
) 
-.06 .02 .04 .1* .27* -.11* .53* -     
(9) Greed 
(raw) -.06 -.01 .07 .1** .59* .27* .62* *.33 -    
(10) 
Greed 
(weighted
) 
-.06 -.02 -.02 .03 .27* -.1** .28* -.05 .41* -   
(11) 
Aggressio
n (raw) 
-.02 .02 .2 .09** .47* .15* .54* .28* .51* .22* -  
(12) Agg. 
(weighted
) 
.05 -.01 .05 -.03 -.06 -.34* .05 -.02 .03** -.24* .29* - 
*p<.01, **p<.05 
 
Table 4. Results of Correlational Analysis for Model 3 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(1) Bothered -       
(2) Dejected .53* -      
(3) Angry .62* .58* -     
(4) Expected Offer .14* .09** .16* -    
(5) SES Ladder .001 -.04 -.02 .14* -   
(6) Maternal 
Education -.03 -.03 -.01 -.07 .15* -  
(7) Parental Income -.01 .05 .09 .05 .27* .34* - 
*p<.01, **p<.05 
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SES and Expectations. We first examined the relationship between SES and 
expectations of offers in the UG.  It was hypothesized that higher levels of SES would 
predict greater expectations of offer amount. To test this we conducted a simple linear 
regression analysis in which we regressed expectations on SES. As hypothesized, we 
found that for every unit increase on the SES Ladder, the expected amount of tickets 
increased by .09 (R2 =.02, B=4.02, F(1,607)=11.2, p<.01).  
Offer Decisions. Next we examined how these expectations of offers predicted 
downstream decisions to accept or reject offers. To test this, logistic mediation analyses 
were conducted using Model 4 of the PROCESS macro, where SES was the IV, 
expectations of offers served as the mediator, and the decisions to accept or reject offers 
was the DV. Our analyses revealed that the expected offer amount partially mediated 
the relationship between the SES Ladder and decisions to accept or reject the offer 
(ω=.03, 95% CI [.01, .06]). As shown in Table 5, higher levels of SES predicted greater 
expectations of unfair offers, and these predicted more rejections of unfair offers.  
Perceptions of unfair offers. In our next set of analyses we tested how 
expectations of offer amounts mediated the relationship between SES and perceptions 
of the unfair offer. To test this, mediation analyses were conducted using Model 4 of the 
PROCESS macro. The SES Ladder was our IV, expectations of offers served as the 
mediator, and perceptions of the offer (raw and weighted) were the DVs.   
Unfairness. In this set of mediation analyses, perceptions of unfairness (raw) 
and unfairness (weighted) served as the DVs. Our analyses revealed that the expected 
offer amount partially mediated the relationship between the SES Ladder and raw 
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evaluations of the offer as unfair (ω=.18, 95% CI [.01, .04]). As shown in Table 6, 
higher levels of SES predicted greater expectations of unfair offers, and these predicted 
higher perceptions of the offer as unfair (raw). There was no significant mediation 
effect of expectations for the SES Ladder-unfair (weighted) relation (see Table 6).  
Disrespectful. In this set of mediation analyses, perceptions of disrespect (raw) 
and disrespect (weighted) served as the DVs. As shown in Table 6, our analyses 
revealed that there was no significant mediation effect of expectations for either the 
SES Ladder-disrespect (raw) or the SES Ladder-disrespect (weighted) relations.  
Greedy. In this set of mediation analyses, perceptions of greed (raw) and greed 
(weighted) served as the DVs. As shown in Table 6, our analyses revealed that there 
was no significant mediation effect of expectations for either the SES Ladder-greed 
(raw) or the SES Ladder-greed (weighted) relations.  
Aggressive. In this set of mediation analyses, perceptions of aggression (raw) 
and aggression (weighted) served as the DVs. As shown in Table 6, our analyses 
revealed that there was no significant mediation effect of expectations for either the 
SES Ladder-aggression (raw) or the SES Ladder-aggression (weighted) relations 
Feelings towards unfair offers. In our final set of analyses we tested how 
expectations of offers mediate the relationship between SES and feelings towards the 
offer. To test this, mediation analyses were conducted using Model 4 of the PROCESS 
macro. The SES Ladder was our IV, expectations of offers served as the mediator, and 
feelings towards the offers were the DVs.   
Bothered. In this set of mediation analyses, feelings of bother served as the DV. 
Our analyses revealed that there was a significant mediation (ω=.02, 95% CI [.01, .05]). 
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As shown in Table 7, higher levels of SES predicted greater expectations of unfair 
offers, and these predicted higher feelings of bother.  
Dejected. In this set of mediation analyses, feelings of dejection served as the 
DV. Our analyses revealed that there was a significant mediation (ω=.01, 95% CI [.001, 
.03]). As shown in Table 7, higher levels of SES predicted greater expectations of unfair 
offers, and these predicted higher feelings of dejection. 
Angry. In this set of mediation analyses, feelings of anger served as the DV. Our 
analyses revealed that there was a significant mediation (ω=.02, 95% CI [.003, .04]). As 
shown in Table 7, higher levels of SES predicted greater expectations of unfair offers, 
and these predicted higher feelings of anger. 
Maternal Education and Parental Income. We also tested all of the above 
analyses with maternal education and parental income as IVs. For the first set of logistic 
mediation analyses, expectations did not significantly mediate the maternal education-
offer decision relation or the parental income-offer decision relation. In the second set 
of mediation analyses, expectations did not significantly mediate any of the relations 
between maternal education and perceptions of the offer. Expectations also did not 
significantly mediate any of the relations between parental income and perceptions of 
the offer. For the final set of mediation analyses, expectations did not significantly 
mediate the maternal education-feelings towards offer relation or the parental income-
feelings towards offer relation.  
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Table 5. Results of Mediation Analyses for Model 1 with SES Ladder as the 
Independent Variable 
 a path b path c’ path 
Dependent 
Variable B t P B z p B z p 
Offer Decision 
.09 3.35 <.01 .3 3.92 <.01 -.1 
-
2.08 .038 
 
 
Table 6. Results of Mediation Analysis for Model 2 with SES Ladder as the 
Independent Variable 
 a path b path c’ path 
Dependent Variable B t p B t p B t p 
Unfair (raw) .09 3.35 <.01 .2 4.88 <.01 -.11 -3.91 <.01 
Unfair (weighted) .09 3.35 <.01 .66 2.4 .02 - - n.s. 
Disrespectful (raw) .09 3.35 <.01 .16 2.59 <.01 - - n.s. 
Disrespectful 
(weighted) .09 3.35 <.01 .6 2.82 <.01 - - n.s. 
Greedy (raw) .09 3.35 <.01 .09 2.78 <.01 - - n.s. 
Greedy (weighted) .09 3.35 <.01 - - n.s. - - n.s. 
Aggressive (raw) .09 3.35 <.01 .09 2.29 .01 - - n.s. 
Aggressive 
(weighted) .09 3.35 <.01 - - n.s. - - n.s. 
 
 
Table 7. Results of Mediation Analysis for Model 3 with SES Ladder as the 
Independent Variable 
 a path b path c’ path 
Dependent Variable B t p B t p B t p 
Bothered .09 3.35 <.01 .23 3.7 <.01 - - n.s. 
Dejected .09 3.35 <.01 .12 2.58 .01 - - n.s. 
Angry .09 3.35 <.01 .17 4.06 <.01 - - n.s. 
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Figure 2. SES Ladder and offer decision mediation model. 
This figure illustrates the relationship between the SES Ladder and decisions to accept 
or reject the offer as partially mediated by expectations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SES Ladder 
B = .09* B = .3* 
B =-.1 , p = .04 
*: p<.01 
Offer 
Decision 
Expectations 
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Figure 3. SES Ladder and evaluation of offer mediation model. 
This figure illustrates the relationship between the SES Ladder and evaluations of the 
offer as unfair as mediated by expectations. 
 
 
Figure 4. SES Ladder and feelings towards the offer mediation model.  
This figure illustrates the relationship between the SES Ladder and bothered feelings 
towards the offer as mediated by expectations. 
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Discussion 
The current study investigated whether and how expectations influence the 
relationship between SES and decisions, perceptions, and feelings in a socially 
provocative situation. Results revealed that, consistent with the first hypothesis, 
subjective status predicted expectations in the UG, such that as subjective SES rose, so 
did expectations. The second hypothesis was also supported in that expectations 
mediated the relationship between subjective SES and offer decisions. In regards to the 
third hypothesis, expectations only mediated the relationship between subjective status 
and perceptions of unfairness. Similarly, expectations mediated the relationship 
between subjective status and feelings (bothered, dejected, and angry). These findings 
support the entitlement hypothesis proposed by Hu, Cao, Blue, & Zhou (2014). The 
entitlement hypothesis stipulates that participants occupying low status will feel less 
entitled to fair offers, while high status participants will feel more entitled to fair offers. 
If expectations did indeed measure entitlement, then these findings also expand on 
system justification theory’s hypothesis that low status individuals express depressed-
entitlement relative to people with higher status who might experience elevated-
entitlement (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004). It also furthers Pelham 
and Hetts’ (2001) work that indicated men experience elevated-entitlement in 
comparison with women, by suggesting there are differences in entitlement within men. 
In all cases, only models with subjective status were significant. Objective indicators of 
status failed to support any of the hypotheses, suggesting that subjective SES may 
measure entitlement better than objective SES.   
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There are two limitations in this study that can provide avenues for future 
research. The first limitation is that this study only looked at the role of expectations in 
men. Previous research has suggested that women experience depressed-entitlement 
based on their gender and the cultural beliefs associated with being a woman (O’Brien 
& Major, 2009). In addition to experiencing depressed-entitlement in comparison with 
men, women handle socially provocative situations in fundamentally different ways. 
For instance, women tend to aggress less frequently than men and primarily use 
aggressive tactics in the face of physical danger (Cross & Campbell, 2011).  Since the 
UG is a physically safe situation, women may be less inclined to reject unfair offers if 
rejection is in any way a measure of aggression. In addition, Eisenegger, Naef, Snozzi, 
Heinrichs, and Fehr (2010) found that administering testosterone to women resulted in 
more generous offers in the UG. Other research with men has found contrasting results, 
that administering testosterone led men to propose less generous offers (Zak et al., 
2009). In addition to influencing decisions in the UG, sex differences may influence 
entitlement. Future research might consider looking at entitlement’s role in socially 
provocative situations across genders to determine what differences may or may not 
exist. The second limitation of this study is that it measured SES through 
questionnaires. Manipulating status might lead to different results. Recent research 
suggested priming participants to feel poor in the UG caused them to reject more offers 
because of fairness concerns (Bratanova, Loughnan, Klein, & Wood, 2016). These 
findings contrast the results of this study that suggested the higher one’s SES, the more 
they expect in the UG. In other words, the higher one thinks they are in society, the 
more likely they are to feel entitled to certain allocations. This falls in line with 
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prevalent SJBs in the U.S.. Hence, the higher one thinks they are in society, the more 
likely they are to feel entitled to certain allocations. This falls in line with prevalent 
SJBs in the U.S.. In the U.S., examples of SJBs include the Protestant work ethic and 
the belief in individual mobility—the American dream (O’Brien & Major, 2009). 
The American dream stipulates that through hard work, individuals can improve 
their social standing. Despite individual aspirations, the personal income gap has 
become substantially more unequal since the 1980s (Wodtke, 2016).  In April of 2016, 
the then presidential candidate Donald Trump declared that the American dream had 
died (Voorhees, 2016). The results of this study can shed light on the so-called death of 
the American dream by suggesting that elevated-entitlement influences outcomes in 
unfair or socially provocative situations. Other studies have also found that elevated-
entitlement promotes the status quo, helping higher-status individuals to maintain their 
status (e.g. Ball & Eckel, 1996; Ball, Eckel, Grossman, & Zane, 2001; Hu, Cao, Blue, & 
Zhou, 2014; Hu et al., 2016; Pelham & Hetts, 2001). Elevated entitlement assumes that 
higher-status individuals feel entitled to greater allocations, possibly believing that they 
earned those allocations (Hoffman & Spitzer, 1985). If higher-status individuals feel 
like they earned their allocations, this might affect their generosity and willingness to 
even out the economic playing field (Piff, Kraus, Côte, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010). In this 
study, expectations mediated the relationships between subjective SES and offer 
decisions, perceptions of the offer as unfair, and feelings towards the offer. This 
suggests that expectations, feelings of entitlement, may influence outcomes in a socially 
provocative situation.  
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